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Abstract
This Note argues that, while the Pricing Regulation is a positive step in the development of a
common market within the EEC, it is protectionist in its approach to developing nations. Part I an-
alyzes the complaint against Hyundai in the context of the international shipping industry. Part II
examines the EEC’s conflicting policy goals in adopting the Pricing Regulation. Part III discusses
the dichotomy between the Pricing Regulation itself and the EEC’s trade policy within the Com-
munity. This Note concludes that the EEC must reconcile its policy of elimination barriers to free
trade within the Community with its interest in protecting its domestic market from competition
outside the Community.
THE EEC'S UNFAIR PRICING PRACTICES
REGULATION: NEW WAVE OF COMPETITION
OR PROTECTIONISM IN COMMUNITY
SHIPPING?
INTRODUCTION
The European Economic Community' ("EEC" or "Com-
munity") faces growing competition in the shipping industry
from developing maritime nations. The Community's share
of world shipping is declining, as are the size of its shipping
fleet, the number ofjobs, and the profits derived from the in-
dustry.3 At the same time, developing nations are resorting to
protectionist measures to promote their own national fleets
and to increase their share of world trade.4 The developing
nations are seeking the economic growth and international
prestige associated with national fleets.5 For its part, the EEC
recently enacted what it calls an unfair pricing practices regula-
tion6 ("Pricing Regulation") to protect its fleets from the re-
1. The European Economic Community was founded in 1957. Treaty Establish-
ing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179-I) (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) (unofficial English
trans.) [hereinafter Treaty]. The EEC currently comprises 12 Member States:
Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Treaty Between the
Member States of the European Communities and the Kingdom of Spain and the
Portuguese Republic to the European Economic Community and to the European
Atomic Energy Community, O.J. L 302/9 (1985). For a discussion of the structure of
the EEC, see D. LASOK &J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (4th ed. 1987).
2. Progress Towards a Common Transport Policy in Maritime Transport, COM(85) 90
final (Mar. 14, 1985) [hereinafter Common Transport Policy]. The developing maritime
nations are the former colonies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. ADEMUNI-ODEKE,
PROTECTIONISM AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING 15 (1984). The term
"developing nations" will be used to refer to those third-world nations that offer a
lower level of consumer products to their inhabitants than the European nations and
the United States do to theirs. Id. at 15. While the designation "developing nation"
implies an inferior economic status, some of these nations, particularly those of
Southeast Asia, have increased their shares of the EEC market. E. FREY-WOUTERS,
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE THIRD WORLD 183 (1980).
3. Common Transport Policy, supra note 2, at 34-35.
4. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 13.
5. A. HERMAN, SHIPPING CONFERENCES 161 (1983).
6. Council Regulation No. 4057/86, Oj. L 378/14 (1986) [hereinafter Pricing
Regulation]. The Pricing Regulation established a procedure to combat the unfair
pricing practices of third countries causing damage to EEC liner shipping. Id. art. 1,
O.J. L 378/14, at 15.
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strictive practices of non-EEC nations and to maintain its mo-
nopoly in the shipping industry.7 In July 1987, eight EEC ship-
ping lines filed a complaint under the Pricing Regulation with
the Commission of the European Communities ("Commis-
sion") against Hyundai Merchant Marine ("Hyundai"), a South
Korean shipping line.8 This complaint will test the efficacy of
the Pricing Regulation in implementing the EEC's maritime
policies.
This Note argues that, while the Pricing Regulation is a
positive step in the development of a common market within
the EEC, it is protectionist in its approach to developing na-
tions. Part I analyzes the complaint against Hyundai in the
context of the international shipping industry. Part II exam-
ines the EEC's conflicting policy goals in adopting the Pricing
Regulation. Part III discusses the dichotomy between the Pric-
ing Regulation itself and the EEC's trade policy within the
Community. This Note concludes that the EEC must reconcile
its policy of eliminating barriers to free trade within the Com-
munity with its interest in protecting its domestic market from
competition outside the Community.
I. TRADE TENSIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
SHIPPING INDUSTRY
The highly competitive structure of the international ship-
ping industry set the stage for the battle between the EEC and
developing nations for access to world shipping cargo. 9 This
competition has exacerbated trade tensions between the EEC
and developing nations in the shipping industry.
A. Structure of the International Shipping Industry
There are three main types of ships in the shipping indus-
7. Id. art. 1, O.J. L 378/14, at 15.
8. EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE Docu-
MENTS (No. 4665) 11 (Nov. 23-24, 1987); see also Making Waves for World Shipping, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1987, at 6, col. 1 (for a discussion of the background of the com-
plaint) [hereinafter Making Waves].
9. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 24-25. There is an imbalance in the distri-
bution of the world shipping fleet, with the developing nations trying to increase
shipping trade and the traditional nations trying to preserve their monopoly. Id.; see
also E. GOLD, MARITIME TRANSPORT 275-81 (1981) (for a discussion of the problems
developing nations faced in entering the shipping industry).
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try: l° cargo liner carriers," dry bulk carriers,' 2 and liquid bulk
carriers. 13 Liner carriers offer services to a variety of shippers
for a fixed route at a fixed time.' 4 Bulk carriers are usually
chartered by one shipper at a time, and do not operate on fixed
schedules.' 5 The nations that operate all these shipping serv-
ices can also be categorized into three groups.' 6 The first
group, the traditional maritime nations, consists of the indus-
trialized countries of Western Europe, North America, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand.' 7 The second group, the develop-
ing nations, consists of states in the process of developing their
own shipping fleets, such as South Korea, Singapore, the Phil-
ippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, as well as Hong Kong.' 8 The
third group consists of the nations of Eastern Europe, whose
10. A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 3. Approximately 80% of world trade is carried
by ship. Id. World shipping cargo "is carried in vessels sailing under different flags
having the right, under the freedom of the seas principle, to move to almost every
port on the globe." d.; see also ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 231-43 (description
of the freedoms enjoyed by traditional shipping lines).
11. A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 3. The cargo liner carriers operate on specific
routes with fixed schedules and fixed rates. Id. They carry various cargo loads from
different shippers to different receivers. Id. The main features of liner service are the
frequency of service and the distribution of cargo among several ports. Id.
12. A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 3. Bulk carriers carry the seven bulk commodi-
ties: oil, iron and manganese ores, coal, grain, bauxite, and phosphates. Id. Bulk
carriers are usually chartered by one shipper at a time. Id. Tramp service, a form of
bulk carriage, competes with liners when cargo is scarce, or when the tramp has room
for more cargo. Id. at 3 n.4. "Liner operators, or common carriers, are distinguished
from 'tramp' operators who charter the vessel to one or more shippers on the basis of
a time or voyage charter at freely negotiated rates. Tramp operators do not operate
over regularly established routes nor do they advertise their sailing." Bayer, Antitrust
Comes to Maritime Transport in the European Economic Community, 34 FED. BAR NEWS &J.
299, 306 n.2 (1987).
13. A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 3.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 15; see also A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 157
(further discussion of the distinctions between the traditional and developing na-
tions).
17. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 15. The traditional nations advocate free
trade policy because they benefit from such a system. Id. at 27. The United Kingdom
developed its fleet through the use of protectionist practices, and did not advocate
freer trade until the middle of the 20th century. Id. at 27-28. In addition, France and
Italy have provided financial assistance to their shipping industries. Id. at 31.
18. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 13. The developing nations advocated a
nationalist approach to shipping, allowing each nation to use protectionism to estab-
lish and develop its own national fleet. Id. at 26. The developing nations lacked the
manpower, capital, technical know-how, established ports, and infrastructure to es-
tablish their own fleets without protectionist practices. Id. at 13.
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shipping industries are state-run.' 9
The traditional nations dominated world shipping before
World War II.20 Their shipping lines operated free of state
intervention,2 ' and were subject to common standards of com-
mercial treatment. 2 The traditional nations recognized the
concept of flag equality, under which a shipping nation was ex-
pected to treat the ships of all other nations in the same man-
ner. 2 3 The traditional standards of shipping were embodied in
the 1948 Convention of the International Maritime Organiza-
tion ("IMO").24 One function of the IMO is to promote the
wide availability of maritime services by discouraging discrimi-
natory, unfair, and restrictive practices affecting marine trans-
19. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 15. For example, the Soviet Union offers
liner services at a much lower rate than other carriers for a variety of political and
commercial reasons. A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 99. The difference in Soviet ac-
counting methods from Western methods makes it difficult to prove that the Soviets
are offering liner services below cost. Id.
20. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 24; see also E. GOLD, supra note 9, at 233-40
(for a discussion of the economic system that emerged from World War II).
21. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 11.
22. Id. at 231. The commonly accepted standards of commercial treatment in
international treaty practice are the standard of reciprocity, standard of the most fa-
vored nation, and standard of national treatment. Id. These standards were not in-
tended to grant specific material rights to nations, but rather "to establish a pattern
from which material rights could be achieved." Id.
Under the standard of reciprocity, each party agrees to grant the same rights and
privileges that the others grant in return. Id. Under the standard of most favored
nation, a state must extend to a receiving state all rights and advantages that it con-
cedes to a third state, so that the receiving state is never in a position inferior to any
third state. Id. Under the standard of national treatment, each state is to treat for-
eign nationals as it treats its own nationals. Id. at 231-32. Any discrimination in
shipping could be an infringement of these standards of commercial treatment. Id. at
232. Although the traditional nations blame the developing nations for the break-
down in these standards, in practice almost every nation has departed from these
standards in one way or another. Id.
23. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 232-34. The formal concept of flag equal-
ity envisions the treatment of all shipping nations in the same manner. Id. The mate-
rial concept of flag equality is the resulting equality of treatment. Id. The crucial
concept of such equality is that it can be achieved either with or without state inter-
vention. Id.
24. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 252; see Convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization, done Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621,
T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48. The International Maritime Organization is a
specialized agency of the United Nations that facilitates cooperation among govern-
ments in shipping, gives advice to other international shipping bodies, and discour-
ages discriminatory, unfair, and restrictive shipping practices. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra
note 2, at 253. The IMO Convention has been ratified by over one hundred nations,
including many of the traditional, developing, and Warsaw Pact nations. Id.
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port.25 The traditional approach was also expressed in the
provisions of the 1919 Convention of the International Labor
Organization ("ILO"),2 6 which set minimum standards and
work conditions for seamen."
The traditional nations conduct most of their trade with
developing nations through the liner conference system. 28 In
a liner conference, a group of line owners engaged on a partic-
ular trade route agree among themselves to limit competition
and to set freight rates and schedules.29 One function of the
liner conferences is to insulate shippers from the short-term
effect of market fluctuations, which often cause variations in
the price of transport that bear no relation to actual cost.3"
As net consumers of shipping services, developing nations
faced ,deteriorating balance-of-payments problems in the
1960s and 1970s. 3 ' The freight rates set by the liner confer-
ences aggravated this imbalance in the flow of foreign ex-
25. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 253.
26. E. GOLD, supra note 9, at 331; see Instrument for the Amendment of the Con-
stitution Adopted by the International Labour Conference at its Twenty-Ninth Ses-
sion, Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Stat. (pt. 3) 3485, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15 U.N.T.S. 35. The
original constitution of the International Labor Organization formed part XIII of the
Treaty of Versailles of 28 June 1919. L. SOHN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND
INTEGRATION 465 (student ed. 1986). In 1946, the ILO severed its connection with
the League of Nations and became a specialized agency of the United Nations. Id.
The ILO regulates international labor conditions in order to achieve full employ-
ment, a minimum living wage to all employed, and adequate protection for the health
of workers in all occupations. 62 Stat. (pt. 3) at 3558, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, at 84-86, 15
U.N.T.S. at 108-10.
27. Bredimas, The Common Shipping Policy of the EEC, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9,
28 (1981).
28. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 33. A liner conference "is an organization
of cargo shipping companies providing regular, scheduled sailings on a particular
trade route." Note, Economic Analysis of the United Nations Code of Conduct for Liner Con-
ferences, 29 STAN. L. REV. 853, 855 (1977). Liner conferences regulate conduct of
members by setting uniform rates, allocating a shipping quota to member lines, and
limiting the number of visits per port. Id. at 856. A member line can be expelled
from the conference if it violates the established regulations. Id. The developing
nations contend that liner conferences charge excessive rates and refuse to admit
developing nations' shipping fleets to participate in conference trade. A. HERMAN,
supra note 5, at 157-58; see also E. GOLD, supra note 9, at 349-50 (for further discussion
of the role of liner conferences in shipping).
29. E. GOLD, supra note 9, at 350.
30. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 24.
31. Id. at 48. The developing nations are "chronically short of foreign exchange
and the need to pay freight rates in convertible currencies worsens their already
shaky balance of payments." A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 158.
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change.32 Furthermore, developing nations lacked the re-
sources to establish national fleets in a shipping industry domi-
nated by liner conferences. 3 Thus, the governments adopted
specific measures to encourage shipping. 4 These nations per-
mitted flag preferences,35 including cargo reservation3 6 and
flag discrimination, 37 and state subsidies to encourage the de-
velopment of national fleets.38 Such practices conflicted with
the traditional nations' ostensibly free-trade approach.3 9
In 1974, the United Nations Conference for Trade and
Development adopted the Code of Conduct for Liner Confer-
ences41 ("Liner Code") with the overwhelming support of de-
32. A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 158. The prices for imported manufactured
goods were increasing, while the value of the developing nations' exports was de-
creasing, resulting in a deficit in their balance of payments. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra
note 2, at 24-25.
33. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 7. A major grievance of developing na-
tions is the lack of capital required to build new fleets, or even to buy second-hand
vessels to use for shipping. A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 161. The developing nations
complain about a lack of capital to invest in establishing fleets and seek financial
support from the traditional nations. Id. In addition, the establishment of a national
fleet "will give the young nations stronger bargaining power in rate negotiations and
will increase competition among the carriers." Id. They recognize the importance of
shipping to their national security, international trade, and overall economic devel-
opment. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 9. For developing nations, "the flag of the
ship assumes the role of identity of economic nationhood, emulation of power and
independence and a symbolic value of industrial competence." Id. at 305.
34. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 26.
35. Id. at 71. Flag preference is the sharing of cargo with shipping lines based
on their nation of origin. Id.
36. Id. at 74. Cargo reservation is a form of flag preference, under which a na-
tion sets aside specific freight for its own lines in spite of its costs or inefficiencies. Id.
37. Id. at 73. Flag discrimination is another form of flag preference that "seeks
to reserve a portion of the volume of cargo flowing between the trading partners,
with the object of directly favoring certain shipowners . . . " Id.
38. Id. at 148. Maritime subsidies "are payments by the state to producers or
distributors in order to reduce prices, and ... are inevitably linked to transportation
and international trade." Id. Since World War II, both traditional nations and devel-
oping nations have resorted to state intervention and subsidies favoring the maritime
industry. Id. at 149. Among the subsidies granted to the maritime industry are direct
grants of aid to vessels operating in international service, operational subsidies to
place the cost of operating ships on a parity with foreign competitors, and grants to
encourage the construction and modernization of shipping fleets. Id. at 152-59.
39. Id. at 231. The developing nations were not part of the formulation of the
traditional maritime rules, and do not feel bound by them. Id. at 232.
40. The United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on a Code of Conduct
for Liner Conferences, April 6, 1974, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/l I Rev. I and Corr. I
(1974) [hereinafter Liner Code], reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 917 (1974). The Liner Code
went into effect in 1983, as soon as at least 24 nations carrying a combined tonnage
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veloping nations. 4 The Liner Code criticizes the traditional
nations' monopoly in the shipping industry,42 and grants de-
veloping nations greater access to liner conference trade.4"
The most important provision of the Liner Code states that in
trade between two states, each nation's shipping lines have
equal rights to eighty percent of the trade, with third countries
having a right to the remaining twenty percent.4 4 This "40-40-
20" formula was designed to benefit developing nations by al-
lowing them much greater access to liner trade than they had
prior to the adoption of the Liner Code.45
After some disagreement among Member States, 46 the
EEC finally approved the Liner Code in 1979, 47 but exempted
trade between Member States and members of the Organiza-
tion of Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD").4 a
of not less than 25% of the world liner tonnage ratified it. Id. pt. I, ch. VII, art. 49,
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. at 941. For a critique of the Liner Code, see Economic Analysis,
supra note 28, at 853.
41. A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 170. The European reaction was mixed.
Bredimas, supra note 27, at 11. France, Germany, and Belgium favored the Liner
Code, while the United Kingdom and Denmark opposed it. Id.
42. Liner Code, supra note 40, pt. I, ch. II, art. 1, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. at 919-20.
The Liner Code was intended to combat the discriminatory practices of traditional
nations in international commerce. E. GOLD, supra note 9, at 349-50. The Liner
Code entered into force in 1983, when the final nation necessary for the Code to
come into force signed. A. HERMAN, supra note 5, at 176.
43. Liner Code, supra note 40, pt. I, ch. II, art. 2, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. at 920-21.
44. Id.
45. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 77. The developing nations believed that
the Liner Code was an "international recognition of their legitimate right to use bi-
lateralism as a mechanism to establish and develop their own national merchant
marines." Id.
46. Bredimas, supra note 27, at 11.
47. Council Regulation No. 954/79, O.J. L 121/1 (1979). The EEC approved
the Liner Code when it became obvious that some Member States would adopt it
even if the Community opposed it. Bredimas, supra note 27, at 11. While France and
Belgium believed the Liner Code would increase their share of world trade, the
United Kingdom opposed it. Id. "It appears, however, that the EEC in accepting the
Code was more conscious of its value in combating the incursions of Soviet tonnage
into Common Market trades, often operating outside the conferences, than of con-
tributing to the realisation of the legitimate aspirations of the [developing nations]."
ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 301.
48. Council Regulation No. 954/79, O.J. L 121/1, at 4 (1979). The Organiza-
tion of Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") was established by con-
vention December 14, 1960, originally as the Organization for European Economic
Co-operation, and entered into force September 30, 1961. The OECD "is an instru-
ment for intergovernmental cooperation on matters relevant to economic and social
policy by the market-economy industrialised countries." R. BLANPAIN, THE OECD
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This exemption effectively excluded seventy-five percent of the
world's conference trades from the Liner Code's provisions. 49
As a result, developing nations' access to conference trades has
not been substantially increased by the Liner Code.5" Thus,
developing nations have continued to employ protectionist
practices to encourage their own national fleets. 5'
In response to the restrictive pricing practices of develop-
ing nations, and in response to pressure by domestic shipping
interests, the EEC Member States have taken action to main-
tain their dominance in the shipping industry.52 For example,
in 1961 West Germany enacted legislation that restricted ship-
ping trade from nations that excluded German ships from
shipping trade.53 Italy adopted a similar measure in 1963, and
the United Kingdom followed suit in 1980. r' After decades of
tension, a confrontation between developing and EEC nations
was therefore inevitable.
B. The European Shipping Lines' Complaint Against Hyundai
The complaint against Hyundai is the first attempt by the
EEC's shipping lines to test the efficacy of the 1987 Pricing
Regulation.55 It reveals that EEC shippers fully intend to use
the Pricing Regulation to combat the unfair trade practices of
developing nations.56 The complaint may also be the first of a
series of complaints directed at the EEC's shipping competi-
tors, including the Soviet Union.57 The Comit6 des Associa-
tions d'Armateurs des Communaut6s Europeennes
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND LABOUR RELATIONS 1976-1979, at
25 (1979); see Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment, Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 888 U.N.T.S. 141.
49. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 302.
50. Id. at 302.
51. Id. at 57. The developing nations promote their own national fleets "as a
means of attempting to rectify this disequilibrium." Id.
52. Id. at 119. The OECD nations "have continued to take action to resist the
growth of these discriminatory practices and to show that they are contrary to inter-
national trade." Id.
53. Id. at 120.
54. Id. at 120-21.
55. See Making Waves, supra note 8.
56. Id.
57. EEC Group to Study Soviet Freight Rates, Lloyd's List, Aug. 14, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
EEC MARITIME PRICING REGULATION
("CAACE"),58 a trade association of European shippers, filed
the complaint against Hyundai on behalf of eight EEC ship-
ping lines.59 Seven of these shipping lines were members of
the Australia-to-Europe liner conference, and the eighth was
the only other EEC shipping line on the route.60 The com-
plaint alleges that Hyundai cut rates to uneconomical levels on
the Australia-to-Europe route,6' received favorable loan rates
and repayment terms from the South Korea State Bank,6 2 re-
ceived preferential flag reservation treatment from the South
Korean government,63 and received state subsidies for the
purchase of the ships that it operated on the route.64 More-
over, the complaint broadly attacks the South Korean indus-
trial infrastructure. 65
The complaint further alleges that South Korean shipping
practices have caused a seven-percent decrease in utilization of
capacity of EEC shippers and a decline in profits on the route,
thereby making it impossible for the EEC lines to cover their
58. CAACE is the trade association of European shippers. Bredimas, supra note
27, at 12.
59. Making Waves, supra note 8.
60. Id. The seven liner conference members are Associated Container Trans-
portation Australia Ltd., P & 0 Containers, Compagnie G~nrale Maritime, Hapag-
Lloyd, Nedlloyd, Lloyd Triestino, East Asiatic Co., and Compagnia Naviera Marasia.
EEC Shipping Row with South Korea Looming, Lloyd's List, Aug. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 1
[hereinafter Shipping Row].
61. EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE Docu-
MENTS (No. 4660) 10 (Nov. 16-17, 1987). While Hyundai began servicing the Austra-
lia-to-Europe route only in late 1986, it is estimated that Hyundai took five percent of
the trade on the route in 1987. Id.
62. Id. The EEC shippers claim Hyundai "has massive outstanding debts which
have been refinanced on favourable terms by the Korean Government bank." Making
Waves, supra note 8. These loans, along with other subsidies, are part of the South
Korean government's aid to the Hyundai industrial group. Id. In the 1980s, the Ko-
rean Maritime and Port Administration offered tax reductions and subsidies to ship-
pers to merge. King, Korea Weeding Out Weak Lines, AM. SHIPPER, Mar. 1984, at 8
[hereinafter Weak Lines]. In 1985, Hyundai bought Korea Marine Transport Com-
pany, Ltd., with government assistance. Hyundai Buys 6576 of KMTC, AM. SHIPPER,
Nov. 1985, at 22; see also ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 116-18 (for a discussion of
actions taken by the South Korean government to encourage expansion of its na-
tional fleets).
63. EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE Docu-
MENTS (No. 4660) 10 (Nov. 16-17, 1987).
64. Id.
65. Id.; see also Weak Lines, supra note 62 (for a discussion of Korean government
practices to encourage shipping).
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costs. 66 The complaint claims that Hyundai, and not the de-
clining U.S. dollar or the depressed state of the Australian
economy, has caused the decline on the route.67 Finally, the
EEC lines allege that Hyundai is able to charge a freight rate
that is thirty percent lower than the average rate on the route
because of the assistance Hyundai receives from the South Ko-
rean government. 68 Hyundai has responded to the complaint
by stating that it is a private line facing the same competitive
pressures as other shippers.69
In November 1987, the Commission announced the com-
mencement of an inquiry into Hyundai's pricing practices.70
Because of the Commission's lengthy consultation and investi-
gative procedures, resolution of the complaint is unlikely in
the near future.71
II. SHIPPING REGULATIONS IN THE EEC
The Pricing Regulation was adopted as one of four regula-
tions applying to the maritime transport sector.72 The other
regulations apply Articles 85 and 86 of the' Treaty of Rome7 3
66. See Weak Lines, supra note 62.
67. Id. Although economic problems in Australia led to a decrease in imports,
the largest drop in freight rates occurred only after Hyundai began operating on the
route. Shipping Row, supra note 60. The U.S. dollar is the predominant currency in
shipping. EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE Docu-
MENTS (No. 4685) 16 (Dec. 19, 1987).
68. EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE Docu-
MENTS (No. 4660) 10 (Nov. 16-17, 1987).
69. Hyundai Denies Allegations, Lloyd's List, Aug. 11, 1987 at 1, col. 1.
70. See generally EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA
PRESSE DOCUMENTS (No. 4660) 10 (Nov. 16-17, 1987).
71. EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE Docu-
MENTS (No. 4665) 11 (Nov. 23-24, 1987). In an address in July 1987, Commissioner
Sutherland called for the formation of the Advisory Committee required under the
Pricing Regulation. Address by Commissioner Sutherland, Comm'n Press Release,
Meeting of Director General of Competition IP(87) 282 (July 1987) (available at the
Fordham International Law Journal office). This Committee must meet and consider the
complaint before any investigation can begin. Pricing Regulation, supra note 6, arts.
6-7, O.J. L 378/14, at 16. After consultation, the Commission can begin an investiga-
tion, normally covering pricing practices at least six months prior to the initiation of
the proceeding. Id. art. 7, OJ. L 378/14, at 16. During the investigation, the Com-
mission must check all information with shipowners, agents, shippers, freight for-
warders, conferences, and associations. Bentley & Ronayne, Anti-dumping Extended to
Shipping Prices, 12 EUR. L. REV. 212, 217 (1987).
72. COMM'N, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1 37 (1986).
73. Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 85, 86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32-34, 298
U.N.T.S. at 48.
1988] EEC MARITIME PRICING REGULATION 893
("Treaty") to sea transport,7 4 lift restrictions on shipping serv-
ices controlled by EEC nationals,75 and coordinate EEC ac-
tions to safeguard free access to cargos in ocean trades. 76 Arti-
cle 85 prohibits agreements that set prices, limit or control
production, or share markets. 77 Article 86 prohibits compa-
nies with dominant shares of the EEC market from abusing
their positions.78 In general, the EEC sought to promote
equality and competition among shipping lines established
within the EEC, 79 reconcile conflicting views of the Liner
Code,"0 and protect the shipping fleets of EEC Member States
from unfair pricing practices by developing nations.8 1
The EEC also attempted to harmonize the views of two
different camps within the Community. 2 The so-called funda-
mentalists, led by France, favored a global approach that
would address all maritime issues at once and in a consistent
manner.8 3 The other, led by the United Kingdom, favored a
74. Council Regulation No. 4056/86, OJ. L 378/4 (1986), 2 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 2764.
75. Council Regulation No. 4055/86, O.J. L 378/1 (1986).
76. Council Regulation No. 4058/86, OJ. L 378/21 (1986).
77. Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 32-33, 298
U.N.T.S. at 48. Article 85 prohibits collusion between undertakings that "have as
their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the Common Market." Id. art. 85(1). In particular, the Treaty prohibits agreements
that consist of "(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or any
other trading conditions; (b) the limitation or control of production, markets, techni-
cal development, or investment .... " Id.
78. Treaty, supra note 1, art. 86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 34, 298 U.N.T.S. at
48. Article 86 prohibits "action by one or more enterprises to take improper advan-
tage of a dominant position within the Common Market or in a substantial part of it
.... Id. Abuse of a dominant position may consist of "(a) the direct or indirect
imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices or of any other inequitable
trading conditions; (b) the limitation of production, markets or technical develop-
ment to the prejudice of consumers ..... d.
79. Common Transport Policy, supra note 2, at i.
80. Bredimas, supra note 27, at 10-12. The Member States disagreed about the
need for the Liner Code. Id. at 11. France, Germany, and Belgium favored it, while
the United Kingdom and Denmark opposed it. Id.
81. Common Transport Policy, supra note 2, at i. The Member States had to "come
to grips with the growing threat to Community interests of protectionist policies and
practices of other countries which make it difficult or impossible to maintain a com-
mercially competitive system." Id.; see also COMM'N, EIGHTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY $ 40 (1979) (for a discussion of the policies that the EEC tried to address in
regulating in the shipping industry).
82. Bredimas & Tzoannos, In Search of a Common Shipping Policy for the E.C., 20J.
COMMON MKT. STUDIES 95, 113 (1981).
83. Id. at 113.
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"mosaic" approach that would deal with maritime issues one at
a time as they arose.84 Because of these related but conflicting
viewpoints, the EEC was slow to adopt an overall package. 5
A. Development of European Competition Law
in the Shipping Industry
As of 1987, sea and air transport were the only areas of
the European economy in which the EEC had failed to adopt
regulations implementing its competition rules, Articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.8 6 The competition rules could
not be applied consistently to shipping among Member States
without Community-wide procedures specifying investigatory
and enforcement powers of the EEC.8 7 Indeed, there was a
84. Id. These differences arose from the different emphasis given to shipping in
each national economy. Id. While France views its shipping sector as a trunk indus-
try, subservient to trade and ship building, the United Kingdom views shipping as a
means to generate employment and balance its payments. Id.
85. Bredimas, supra note 27, at 31. The common shipping policy was slow to
evolve "due to the belated interest of the Member States and their conflicting inter-
ests in shipping matters. For the time being, the Community institutions have con-
fined themselves to a piece-meal approach by regulating certain fields where com-
mon action was necessary." Id.
86. C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 70 (3d ed.
1987). The competition rules are contained in Articles 85 through 94 of the Treaty,
but the basic competition rules of the Treaty are contained in articles 85 and 86. See
generally V. KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 1 (3d ed. 1986). The EEC has a common transport policy, contained in Articles
74 through 84, to develop integrated transportation within the Community. D.
LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 382. However, this policy applies only to rail,
road, and inland waterway transport. C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, supra, at 69-70. Air
and sea transport were exempted from the common transport policy by Article 84(2).
Treaty, supra note 1, art. 84(2), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 31, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47.
The EEC applied the competition rules of the Treaty to rail, road, and inland water-
way transport. Council Regulation No. 1017/68, J.O. L 175/1 (1968), O.J. Eng.
Spec. Ed. 1968(I), at 302, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2761. Air and sea transport
remained exempt from the competition policy by a regulation enacted in 1962.
Council Regulation No. 141, J.O. C 2753 (1962), 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
2401; C. BELLAMY & G. CHILD, supra, at 69-70. See generally Close, Article 84 EEC: The
Development of Transport Policy in the Sea and Air Sectors, 5 EUR. L. REV. 188 (1980) (for a
discussion of the status of air and sea transport under the Treaty). For a discussion
of the application of the competition rules to air transport, see Comment, Competition
and Deregulation: Nouvelles Fronti~resfor the EEC Air Transport Industry?, 10 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 808 (1987). In 1987, the Council adopted a regulation implementing the
competition rules to air transport. Council Regulation No. 3975/87, Oj. L 374/1
(1987).
87. COMM'N, FIFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 14 (1976). Because the
Treaty contains only the bare principles of competition policy, Article 87 requires
that the Council issue regulations to implement detailed competition rules. D. LAsOK
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dispute among Member States, shippers, and the Commission
as to whether and to what extent the competition rules applied
to sea transport.88 Some Member States contended that the
competition rules did not apply to shipping at all.8 °
According to the prevailing view, each Member State
could apply the competition rules to shippers in accordance
with its own laws. °0 This approach would result in conflicting
bodies of national case law developing within the EEC.9 1 The
Commission took the view that it had the power to investigate
abuses in the shipping industry and to propose measures to
end them.9 2
The possibility of inconsistent application of the competi-
tion rules at the national level posed a danger to the liner con-
ferences. 93 The EEC recognized the stabilizing effect of liner
conferences on freight rates and employment in the shipping
industry, 4 and sought to exempt them from application of the
&J. BRIDGE, supra note 1, at 385; see Treaty, supra note 1, art. 87, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1, at 33, 298 U.N.T.S. at 49. Articles 88 and 89 provide transitory measures until
the Council enacts regulations pursuant to Article 87. D. LASOK &J. BRIDGE, supra, at
386; see Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 88, 89, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 34, 298
U.N.T.S. at 49-50.
88. Bredimas & Tzoannos, supra note 82, at 99.
89. Id. These Member States claimed that art. 84(2) exempted sea transport
from all Treaty provisions. Id.
90. Id. "Under Article 88, the relevant authorities in Member States are to rule
on the admissibility of agreements, decisions and conserted practices and on abuses
of dominant position in accordance with the law of their country and with the provi-
sions of Article 85, in particular paragraph 3, and the provisions of Article 86."
COMM'N, Fivr REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 14 (1976). Article 88 is a transi-
tional rule, to be effective until the Council enacts regulations implementing the
competition rules. Treaty, supra note 1, art. 88, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 34, 298
U.N.T.S. at 49. Because the Member States vary in the powers granted to national
courts, the Article 88 procedure could create confusion in the enforcement of com-
petition rules. Comment, supra note 86, at 822.
91. Application of Competition Rules to Sea Transport Proposed, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,339 (1981) [hereinafter Application of Competition].
92. Bredimas, supra note 27, at 30. Article 89 permits the Commission to inves-
tigate infringements of the competition rules and propose measures to remedy the
infringement. Treaty, supra note 1, art. 89, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 34, 298
U.N.T.S. at 49-50.
93. Application of Competition, supra note 91. Without regulations by the Commis-
sion to effect the competition rules for sea transport, "the law as it now stands does
not allow for the consistent application of the rules of competition to sea and air
transport .... [making] for uncertainty in the law, and this is to the disadvantage of
shippers, airlines and users." COMM'N, FIrH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 14
(1976).
94. See Council Regulation No. 954/79, O.J. L 121/1 (1979).
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competition rules.9 5 However, the liner conferences violate
the competition rules because they share cargo, practice flag
discrimination, set freight rates, and receive state subsidies.96
If the Member States applied inconsistent standards to the
liner conferences, the EEC's goal of eliminating trade barriers
among Member States would be defeated. 97
In 1981, the Commission attempted to resolve these con-
flicting interests by issuing a draft regulation to apply Articles
85 and 86 of the Treaty to sea transport, but exempting liner
conferences.98 This draft initially met with some displeasure
within the EEC.99 Member States were reluctant to extend the
Commission's power into an area that traditionally had been
one of national concern. 00 For their part, certain European
shippers opposed the exemption of liner conferences and de-
manded measures that required the liner conferences to nego-
tiate with them on a fairer basis.' 0' The Commission issued a
revised proposal in 1985 that attempted to address these con-
cerns.10 2 At the same time, the Commission issued the Pricing
Regulation to win support for the competition regulation.10 3
95. COMM'N, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 7 (1980). The Commu-
nity sought to recognize the stabilizing role of liner conferences, at the same time
ensuring that they did not violate the EEC's competition rules. Id. 9.
96. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 300.
97. Completing the Internal Market.: White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, COM(85) 310 final, 1 (June 14, 1985).
98. Proposal for a Council Regulation Laying Down Detailed Rules for the Ap-
plication of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to Maritime Transport, O.J. C 282/4
(1981). The preamble states: "[Tihis Regulation must be inspired by the double ne-
cessity, on the one hand to provide for implementing rules that enable the Commis-
sion to assure that competition is not unduly distorted within the common market
and on the other based to avoid excessive regulation of 1he sector." Id. preamble,
oj. C 282/4, at 4.
99. See, e.g., European Shippers Seek Narrower Exceptions to Stimulate More Competition
Among Conferences, 42 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1059, at 739 (Apr. 8,
1982). In particular, the British Shippers' Council sought a legal duty for confer-
ences to negotiate rates with shippers and for a shorter term for loyalty agreements
between shippers and conferences. British Interests Criticize EEC Plan to Extend Competi-
tion Rules to Shipping, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1072, at 67, 68
(1982).
100. COMM'N, THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 48 (1984).
101. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
102. See Common Transport Policy, supra note 2.
103. See Making Waves, supra note 8, at 6, col. 2. "The Community industry had
to pay a price for getting anti-dumping provisions into the maritime package, in the
shape of a promise to give up a large part of its old internal EC route-sharing and
price-fixing accords." Id. "The complement of the Commission's proposal on the
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B. The Unfair Pricing Practices Regulation
In 1978, the European Council authorized a study of the
pricing practices of non-EEC nations in the shipping indus-
try.'0 4 The study revealed that certain trading practices by
third countries had damaged EEC shipping interests. 0 5 In
particular, the EEC liner fleets and their share of the world
market had decreased from 1975 through 1983, while third
countries' share had increased. 0 n The EEC thereby concluded
that it had to address the pricing practices adopted by these
third countries if it was to maintain its preeminent position in
the shipping industry. 0 7
In drafting the Pricing Regulation, the Commission ana-
lyzed the countervailing duty provisions of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade'0 8 and determined that these provi-
sions could not be applied satisfactorily to liner shipping. 0 9 A
regulation with a simplified rate structure was proposed, to
compare freight rates charged for the same commodity on the
same route, without detailed reference to the costs of moving
particular commodities.'' 0
The Pricing Regulation establishes a procedure to re-
spond to third countries whose unfair pricing practices cause
or threaten to cause injury to EEC shipowners or interests."'
It applies only to the liner shipping of third countries, and not
application of the competition articles of the Treaty is the problem of how to deal
with unfair pricing practices. The two questions obviously impact on each other and
in the Commission's view it would be appropriate to make progress on both simulta-
neously." Common Transport Policy, supra note 2, at 34.
104. See Council Decision Concerning the Activities of Certain Third Countries
in the Field of Cargo Shipping, O.J. L 258/35 (Sept. 19, 1978).
105. See Common Transport Policy, supra note 2, at 34-35. The Commission stated
that certain countries, particularly the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, un-
derquoted freight rates and diverted high paying cargo to their own lines. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 35.
108. Id. at 35; See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art.
VI, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, at A24, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, at 19-21, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 212-16.
109. Common Transport Policy, supra note 2, at 36. While the general level of
freight rates is related to the revenue needed to cover costs, the rates for carrying
individual commodities have been traditionally elastic, based on what the market will
bear. Id. The various factors in determining the cost of moving an individual com-
modity sometimes result in extremely complex rate structures. Id.
110. See id.
11. See Pricing Regulation, supra note 6, art. 1, OJ. L 378/14, at 15.
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to any of the bulk shipping categories. 112 The Pricing Regula-
tion defines unfair pricing practices as those that result from
"non-commercial advantages." ' 1 3  If the Commission finds
that unfair pricing practices exist, it shall propose a redressive
duty to the Council that raises the third country's freight rate
to a level that equals the rate charged by the EEC lines on the
route.1 4 The Council may impose a duty by enacting a regula-
tion, taking into account both the Member States' shipping
policies'15 and the impact of a duty on developing nations.'
1 6
Where a complainant objects to a Council decision not to im-
pose a duty, or to the amount of a duty imposed, the complain-
ant can appeal to the European Court of Justice.l"
7
III. BALANCING PROTECTIONISM OUTSIDE THE EEC
AND FREE TRADE WITHIN
The EEC sought to address a series of conflicting policy
goals in adopting the package of regulations on maritime
transport. First, the EEC adopted the Liner Code allowing de-
112. See id. The Pricing Regulation responds to "unfair pricing practices by cer-
tain third country shipowners engaged in international cargo liner shipping." Id.
The Commission did not yet want to extend regulations to bulk shipping "in view of
a lack of experience in this area." COMM'N, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
7 (1980).
113. Pricing Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(b), O.J. L 378/14, at 15. Article
3(b) provides:
"unfair pricing practices" means the continuous charging on a particular
shipping route to, from or within the Community of freight rates for se-
lected or all commodities which are lower than the normal freight rates
charged during a period of at least six months, when made possible by the
fact that the shipowner enjoys non-commercial advantages which are
granted by a State which is not a member of the Community ....
Id.
114. Id. art. 13, OJ. L 378/14, at 19.
115. Id. art. 11-12, OJ. L 378/14, at 19.
116. See EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE Doc-
UMENTS (No. 4646) 16 (Oct. 24, 1987). A delegation from CAACE sought a compro-
mise in dealing with West African nations because of the differences between their
political and legal systems and those of the EEC. Id.
117. Bentley & Ronayne, supra note 71, at 217. Although the Pricing Regulation
does not specifically allow such an appeal, the European Court of Justice has held
that other EEC dumping regulations allow appeal. See Timex v. Council and Com-
mission, Case 264/82, 1985 E.C.R. 861, 870-71, 32, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,143, at 15,785 (allowing an appeal of the amount of a duty imposed by the Coun-
cil); FEDIOL v. Commission, Case 191/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2913, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,013 (allowing an appeal of a Commission decision not to begin an anti-
subsidy proceeding).
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veloping nations access to shipping cargo, but exempted a
large percentage of conference trade."' Then, the EEC ap-
plied its competition rules to promote free trade among Mem-
ber States within the Community. 9 Finally, the EEC adopted
the Pricing Regulation to protect the Member States' shipping
fleets from competition originating outside the Community.120
A. Missing the Boat Within the Community
The Pricing Regulation will not be as effective as the EEC
expects in combatting the restrictive pricing practices of devel-
oping nations. For example, under the Pricing Regulation, an
unfair pricing practice must be the result of "non-commercial
advantages" granted by a third country to its shipper.' 2' How-
ever, the Pricing Regulation does not define the term "non-
commercial advantages."'' 2 2 Without specific guidelines, EEC
shippers do not have a reliable method of determining
whether a third country's shipping line is engaging in unfair
pricing practices on a particular trading route. 23
The Pricing Regulation will also be less effective than ex-
pected because it does not provide for a provisional duty
stage. 24 The Council may enact a redressive duty, but only
118. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
120. Pricing Regulation, supra note 6.
121. Id. art. 3(b), O.J. L 378/14, at 15.
122. Bentley & Ronayne, supra note 71, at 214; see Pricing Regulation, supra note
6, art. 3(b), OJ. L 378/14, at 15. The term "non-commercial advantages" probably
"would include direct or indirect financial aid, special credit conditions, advanta-
geous tax regimes, the employment of seamen on terms and conditions which do not
conform to ILO standards." Bentley & Ronayne, supra note 71.
123. See Common Transport Policy, supra note 2, at 35.
124. Bentley & Ronayne, supra note 71, at 218. The lack of a provisional duty
stage does not prevent the Council from reaching preliminary determinations on
pricing complaints. Id. In such a case, the Commission may expedite its investiga-
tion and propose a regulation to the Council. Id. The Council may then enact the
regulation imposing the duty. Pricing Regulation, supra note 6, art. 13(4)(b), O.J. L
378/14, at 19. While the Pricing Regulation requires Council action, other EEC an-
tidumping measures allow the Commission itself to impose provisional duties. Bent-
ley & Ronayne, supra note 71, at 218. "[T]he practical reality is that the adoption of
redressive duties by Council regulation will often take longer than adoption of provi-
sional duties by Commission regulation." Id.
In calculating the amount of a redressive duty, the Commission can determine
the normal freight rate on a route by a constructed freight rate, taking the cost of a
comparable company on a comparable route plus a reasonable margin of profit. id.
The Pricing Regulation does not give guidelines for determining a comparable route,
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after the completion of lengthy consultation and investigation
procedures. 25 Thus, EEC shippers will not be able to obtain
immediate relief from alleged unfair pricing practices.
126
In addition, the Pricing Regulation is not comprehensive
because it applies only to liner shipping and not to bulk carri-
ers or passenger transport.' 27 In failing to include these serv-
ices under the Pricing Regulation, the EEC protects only one
portion of its shipping industry. ' 2  The Commission is consid-
ering proposals to extend its shipping policy to bulk carriers
and passenger transport so that these areas are protected from
outside competition. 129
B. Limiting Competition Outside the Community
The EEC has established a goal of eliminating trade barri-
ers within the Community and completing its free "internal
market" by 1992.130 To achieve this goal, the EEC has
adopted a number of regulations in recent years intended to
lower trade barriers and promote equality of competition
among the Member States.' 31 However, at the same time that
nor does it define overhead expenses necessary to determine the normal freight rate.
Id. at 214-15. As a result, the Commission will have to use other Community an-
tidumping regulations as a guideline. Id. at 215.
125. Bentley & Ronayne, supra note 71, at 217; see also Pricing Regulation, supra
note 6, arts. 11-13, Oj. L 378/14, at 19.
126. Bentley and Ronayne, supra note 71, at 218. The Commission "must inves-
tigate unfair pricing practices by reference to a period covering normally not less
than six months immediately prior to initiation. If anti-dumping practice is any gui-
dance, such period would usually be at least 12 months in duration." Id. (footnote
omitted).
127. See Pricing Regulation, supra note 6, art. 1, O.J. L 378/14, at 15.
128. COMM'N, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 37 (1986). The
Council has invited the Commission to consider proposals to apply the competition
rules to passenger transport and tramp shipping. Id. The CAACE has protested the
Commission's delay in presenting these additional shipping proposals "in relation to
fiscal, social and technical aspects." EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE
D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE DOCUMENTS (No. 4685) 16 (Dec. 19, 1987). CAACE
urges the adoption of additional Community-wide measures to improve the competi-
tiveness of the Member States' shipping fleets before the Member States take action
on their own. EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE
DOCUMENTS (No. 4713) 11 (Feb. 3, 1988).
129. See COMM'N, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 37 (1986).
130. COM(85) 310 final, supra note 97, 1.
131. For example, the EEC has recently implemented regulations applying its
competition rules within the Community for both airlines, Council Regulation No.
3975/87, O.J. L 374/1 (1987), and shipping, Council Regulation No. 4056/86, OJ. L
378/4 (1986), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2764.
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it is promoting this spirit of free trade within the Community,
the EEC has erected trade barriers directed at nations outside
the Community.3 2 The Pricing Regulation is an example of
the EEC's pursuit of trade liberalization within the Community
at a faster rate than outside the Community. 133
While implementing regulations to apply a "new free
trade policy" within the Community's shipping industry, the
EEC has given its shippers a weapon to combat competition
from outside the Community.1 4 In effect, the EEC is replac-
ing the old system of national trade restrictions in the shipping
industry with new, Community-wide restrictions backed by the
economic weight of the twelve Member States. 3 5
Indeed, if the EEC achieves the "internal market" by
1992, it will become the largest trading bloc in the world. 136
The Community will have a population base of 323 million
people and will account for more than forty percent of world
132. de St. Phalle, And Now, the Tiger of Europe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1988, at
A35, col. 3 [hereinafter Tiger of Europe]. For example, West Germany recently
changed its 14th century Beer Purity Law to allow beer from other Community na-
tions to be imported into Germany, while American beer is still excluded. Id. The
Community also limits the import of automobiles from non-EEC nations. Id. The
EEC plans to apply competition within the Community's telecommunications indus-
try by 1992, while excluding non-EEC nations. Id. Some Member States' auto manu-
facturers, fearful of an onslaught of Japanese imports after 1992, are fighting for
continued protection. Toward Real Community?, TIME, Apr. 18, 1988, at 54, 55 [here-
inafter Real Community?].
133. See Tiger of Europe, supra note 128, at 35, col. 3. "Nonetheless it is curious
that our European trading partners, who have traditionally espoused a laissez-faire
attitude with respect to ocean shipping, choose now to adopt an approach [that]...
represents a major policy change for them." Antitrust Comes to Maritime, supra note 12,
at 299.
134. See supra text accompanying note 107. The shipping industry "is one-of the
areas where Community action is likely to be more effective because of the greater
trading weight of the Community and because only Community action can ensure
that such counter-measures do not merely result in the diversion of cargo from one
Community port to another." Common Transport Policy, supra note 2, at ii.
135. See Tiger of Europe, supra note 132, at 35, col. 2. American firms worry that
the talk of EEC integration is rhetoric to cover up discrimination directed at them.
Real Community?, supra note 132, at 55. Alfred Kingon, the United States Ambassador
to the EEC, stated, "When I speak to E.C. leaders I receive assurances that the Com-
munity will not become Fortress Europe. But when I hear talk of 'nurturing' indus-
tries, I become concerned." Id.
136. Id. With the accession of Greece to the Community, the EEC increased its
percentage of world shipping tonnage and became "the most important shipping
power and pressure group in the framework of international organisations dealing
with shipping .... Bredimas, supra note 27, at 31.
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trade.' 37 The resulting economic capacity will enable the EEC
to surpass the economies of the United States, Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, and to wield tre-
mendous clout in the world market.13 8
As the EEC pursues this goal of economic integration, it
must recognize that it should treat other trading nations as it
treats Member States. Such recognition is essential not only
for the interests of world trade generally but also for the Com-
munity's own long-term economic growth." 9 While lowering
trade barriers within the Community, the EEC should also
strive to lower the barriers that it has erected to protect itself
from competition outside the Community. 4 '
The EEC's shipping policy is part of a dangerous trend
that is fostering the creation of "Fortress Europe."'' This
policy will provoke developing nations to retaliate against
Community fleets, resulting in long-term damage to important
Community shipping interests. 142
CONCLUSION
The Pricing Regulation is an example of the EEC's policy
of raising trade barriers to third nations while liberalizing trade
within the Community. As the EEC becomes an even more
formidable trading power, it must recognize the dangers to
137. Tiger of Europe, supra note 132, at 35, cols. 2-3. The creation of a common
market could boost the Community's economic growth by five percent and generate
up to 1.8 million jobs by the end of the 1990s. Real Community?, supra note 132, at 54.
138. Tiger of Europe, supra note 132, at 35, col. 4.
139. Id. at 35, col. 4.
The series of sweeping changes leading up to 1992 will allow the EEC's
members to enjoy the privileges that accrue to a major trading power, privi-
leges they could not lay claim to individually. But community and European
national leaders must recognize that such privileges come with correspond-
ing obligations to treat all their trading partners fairly.
Id.
140. Id. at 35, col. 3.
141. Id. For example, the EEC has investigated the alleged dumping by Asian
nations of screwdrivers, microwave ovens, semiconductors, computer printers, and
compact-disk players. The Europeans Start to Play a Little Rough, Bus. WK, Feb. 9, 1987,
47.
142. ADEMUNI-ODEKE, supra note 2, at 305. By adopting retaliatory trade meas-
ures, the traditional nations fall into the same trap that developing nations did when
they resorted to flag preferences and discrimination. Id. As a result, retaliatory
measures, such as the Pricing Regulation, will lead to further confrontation, rather
than consultation and cooperation. Id.
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world trade posed by its barriers to nations outside the EEC.
As it eliminates trade barriers within the Community, the EEC
should not use its resulting power as a trading bloc as a
weapon against outside nations. The EEC must reconcile
these conflicting interests, or 1992 will result in increased ten-
sion in world trade.
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